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ABSTRACT1  
As the world becomes increasingly dependent on technology, researchers in both industry and academia 
endeavor to understand how technology is used, the impact it has on everyday life, the artifact life-cycle 
and overall integrations of digital information. In doing so, researchers are increasingly gathering ‘real-
world’ or ‘in-the-wild’ residual data, obtained from a variety of sources, without the explicit consent of the 
original owners. This data gathering raises significant concerns regarding privacy, ethics and legislation, as 
well as practical considerations concerning investigator training, data storage, overall security and data 
disposal. This research surveys recent studies of residual data gathered in-the-wild and analyzes the 
challenges that were confronted. Amalgamating these insights, the research presents a compendium of 
practices for addressing the issues that can arise in-the-wild when conducting residual data research. The 
practices identified in this research can be used to critique current projects and assess the feasibility of 
proposed future research. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Information and communication technologies (ICTs) are now essential parts of the infrastructure of the 
modern global society. These technologies are becoming ubiquitous, remote and mobile. They enable a 
multitude of services and information to be delivered to an end-user on demand and on a diverse range of 
end-user devices. Examples include access to personal information and services, such as social media sites, 
shopping, banking; social activities, such as online activism and voting; and corporate information, such as 
accounting systems or business plans. Indicative of this phenomenon, Gartner (2016), for example, has 
estimated that the combined worldwide shipments of tablets, mobile phones and personal computers (PC) 
will reach 2.4 billion units in 2016.  
Separately, the International Telecommunication Union reported that there were more than 7 billion mobile-
cellular subscriptions in 2015 (International Telecommunication Union, 2015). Gartner (2012) has also 
predicted that annual individual household broadband consumption will increase from 464 gigabytes in 
2011 to 3.3 terabytes in 2016. 
In order to understand the extent and practice of everyday activities mediated through ICTs, researchers 
have increasingly turned to a range of ‘in-the-wild’ methods for data gathering (Hagen, Robertson, Kan, & 
Sadler, 2005). Chamberlain, et al. (2012) have argued that HCI researchers are increasingly leaving the 
laboratory and turning towards ‘in-the-wild’ studies as a better way of understanding user behavior. 
Separately, Rogers et al. (2011) argues that research conducted in-the-wild can generate results and insights 
that cannot be obtained in laboratory environments. 
The increasing capabilities of digital storage devices has also meant that there is an increasing amount of 
information left resident long after its usefulness to its original creator has ceased. Recent research by 
digital forensic researchers has recovered a wealth of personal, sensitive and corporate information from 
relatively small samples of storage devices. Glisson, et al. (2011) recovered over 11,000 data artifacts from 
just 49 mobile devices acquired from secondary markets. In additional research, Glisson and Storer (2013) 
recovered over 7,000 artifacts from 32 mobile phones issued to employees in a Fortune 500 company.  
Similarly, studies by Jones (Jones, Dardick, Davies, Sutherland, & Valli, 2009; Jones, Valli, Sutherland, & 
Thomas, 2008) examined a sample of used hard disks, and reported that over 70% contained personally 
identifiable information. A similar study conducted by the Real Data Corpus (RDC) project obtained 158 
re-sold hard disks, from which they were able to extract 75 gigabytes of data (S. L. Garfinkel & Shelat, 
2003). 
This residual data is of considerable interest to both researchers in industry and academia for several 
reasons, for example:   
• Residual data research provides insights into the magnitude of privacy and security risks taken by 
owners of digital devices when they dispose of them. By conducting surveys of residual data on 
devices sourced from secondary markets, researchers can monitor trends in personal, sensitive and 
corporate information. This data can be examined to identify risks that can be used to implement 
successful security breaches. In turn, researchers can evaluate the effectiveness of new security and 
privacy counter measures, such as custom operating system modifications, in an effort to improve 
data deletion mechanisms and real-time data breach notification solutions. 
• Collection of data sets from residual in-the-wild sources provides digital forensics researchers with 
realistic test cases on which to evaluate new and existing software tools and practices. Generating 
realistic data sets artificially, for evaluation purposes, can be extremely difficult due to the 
variability and idiosyncrasies of individual behavior. Taking data sets from in-the-wild sources 
provides the opportunity to evaluate forensic tools against targets that can be more representative of 
real-world investigations. Insights into digital forensic tool performance, potentially, impacts 
residual data credibility in legal settings. Recent research highlights the importance of residual data 
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credibility by indicating that the introduction of residual data as evidence in legal atmospheres is 
escalating (Berman, Glisson, & Glisson, 2015; McMillan, Glisson, & Bromby, 2013). 
• More widely, in-the-wild residual data is of interest to researchers who seek to better understand 
how users behave with ICTs outside of controlled laboratory settings. The residual data contained 
on devices, such as message conversations, pictures, application logs and office documents, can be 
used to reconstruct details of user behavior. This source of information can provide direct insights 
into how ICTs are used In-The-Wild, rather than how users say they are used. It also initiates 
discussions on ethical handling of residual digital data. 
The investigation of residual data sources raises serious legal and ethical considerations. The very act of 
investigating the extent of privacy risks through analysis of residual data sources creates the potential for 
those very risks to be realized, inadvertently or otherwise, by the researcher.  Unlike other forms of in-the-
wild research, it is unlikely that the former owners of the devices examined will have provided explicit 
consent for their data to be included in the study which is a standard practice in research involving human 
participants (British Psychological Society, 2010). Any subsequent analysis of the data found on the storage 
devices, therefore, raises concerns about the rights and expectations of the device's former owners. In 
particular, there may be concerns as to their rights or expectations of privacy, which may persist well after 
the device has been discarded or sold. 
Expectations of privacy by the former owners of ICT devices may be complex, given that the definition and 
understanding of privacy itself is multi-faceted and remains a contested topic (Smith, Dinev, & Xu, 2011). 
Several authors have conducted literature reviews in the area of privacy, demonstrating the breadth of issues 
(Belanger & Crossler, 2011; Smith & Milberg, 1996).  Despite this complexity and disagreement, it seems 
clear from the literature that the use of residual data in research raises privacy concerns. Clarke (1999) 
defines privacy as “the interest that individuals have in sustaining a personal space, free from interference 
by other people and organizations”. The work identifies four aspects of privacy: person, personal behavior, 
personal communication and personal data (Clarke, 1999); all of which may be affected by the collection of 
residual data. In addition, Belanger and Crossler (2011) note, in their survey of privacy research, that 
control over secondary uses of personal information through “the practice of using data for purposes other 
than those for which they were originally collected” recurs in several definitions of privacy. Therefore, it is 
essential that studies utilizing in-the-wild residual data be designed to acknowledge and address threats to 
individual privacy. 
This paper contributes to the high-level privacy agenda by reviewing existing research studies of residual 
data to identify themes. These themes are then used to identify best practices in residual data research and 
present a compendium of practices for addressing common legal and ethical considerations.   
The paper is structured as follows. Section two reviews existing studies of residual data. Section three 
discusses the ethical and legal challenges that are present in this form of research and describes how the 
previous studies addressed these challenges. Section four synthesizes this discussion into a compendium of 
practices for managing in-the-wild residual data during research. Finally, section five draws conclusions 
and presents future work that should be conducted in this area. 
2. REVIEW OF RESIDUAL STUDIES 
This section reviews the methodologies of previous studies, which recovered and analyzed in-the-wild 
residual data. The studies were selected due to their visibility in academic literature. The focus and results 
of the studies discussed in this section are summarized in Table 1. For reader clarification, the investigator 
referenced in the majority of the paper is the academic primary investigator of a research study, unless 
otherwise stated. 
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2.1 Device Types and Acquisition Processes 
The Garfinkel and Shelat (2003) study describes the collation of data that eventually became the Real Data 
Corpus, a collection of storage device images used for evaluation of digital forensic software. The Jones, et 
al. (Jones, Dardick, et al., 2009) study is part of a series of analyses of trends in residual data on hard disks, 
beginning in 2005. The Glisson, et al. (2011), Jones et al. (2008), and Glisson and Storer (2013) studies 
investigated residual data on mobile and handheld devices. 
Finally, the Jones et al. (2009) and the Szewczyk and Sansurooah (2011) studies investigated residual data 
on flash storage devices which consisted of external USB and memory cards, respectively. All of the studies 
broadly followed the same series of activities.  
These activities include acquiring their target storage devices, recovering data and analyzing the contents of 
the data recovered. However, the amount of information provided on an implemented methodology varied 
from study to study. Both the Glisson, et al. (2011) and the Glisson and Storer (2013) studies provide an 
extensive description of the processes followed and tools used throughout their experiment. Garfinkel and 
Shelat (2003) described their recovery process in detail, but also use a range of custom software tools for 
analysis that are not described in detail.  
 
Table 1: Studies In-The-Wild 
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Garfinkel & 
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d 
                                                      
b Szewczyk and Sansurooah don't report devices containing personally identifying information. The figure shown is the number of 
devices reported to contain resumes and is taken as a lower bound. 
c Glisson, et al. did not attempt to determine whether a former owner of a device could be identified through analysis of residual 
data. The figure shown is the number of devices reported to contain contact database entries and is taken as a lower bound. 
d Garfinkel and Shelat state that ‘practically all’ hard disks that were successfully imaged and had not been sanitized contained user 
deleted files. The figure shown is the total number of hard disks in the study, minus unreadable and sanitized disks. 
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The sampling methodology is reported in varying detail in the studies. Glisson, et al. (2011) described the 
procedures followed for selecting devices for purchase from the online auction site (eBay) and pawnbroker 
sources which included location, pricing and auction format. Jones et al. (Jones, Valli, et al., 2009) and 
Garfinkel and Shelat (2003) both describe tactics used for acquiring devices. These tactics included buying 
devices in bulk from major resellers and buying in small lots to avoid raising individual seller’s suspicions. 
Uniquely, Jones, et al. (2009) sampled devices from a number of different countries and used several 
different research teams to conduct the analysis.   
A number of studies by Jones et al. (Jones, Dardick, et al., 2009; Jones, Valli, et al., 2009; Jones et al., 
2008) provide an outline of their experimental method and tools used, but the steps taken are not described 
in detail. Szewczyk and Sansurooah (2011) reported the use of processes and tools similar to that of two of 
the Jones’ studies (Jones, Dardick, et al., 2009; Jones, Valli, et al., 2009). 
All but one of the studies reported here acquired mobile devices from a range of secondary markets, 
including commercial resellers of ICT equipment; online auction sites, such as eBay; public auctions and 
pawnbrokers. Consequently, the extent to which an intermediary may have altered a storage device before 
being accessed by the researchers may vary between studies. In some of the studies (S. L. Garfinkel & 
Shelat, 2003; Glisson et al., 2011; Jones, Valli, et al., 2009), the researchers acquired the devices 
themselves. However, Jones et al.(Jones, Dardick, et al., 2009; Jones et al., 2008) were supplied with the 
devices by an intermediary, who kept the original source of the devices confidential while the work was 
conducted 
2.2 Protective Measures 
Glisson, et al.,(2011) outlined the training procedures they followed with their investigators before allowing 
them to process the target devices. The investigators were instructed in their legal and ethical 
responsibilities while working on the study. In particular, each investigator was asked to sign a non-
disclosure agreement asserting that they would not discuss the material they viewed within the laboratory 
with anyone outside of the study team. The investigators were then trained on the software recovery tools 
using a sample of ‘safe’ devices known to not contain personal or sensitive information. Details of 
investigator training were not provided in the other studies. 
Glisson, et al.,(2011) describe the laboratory setup and security procedures used to conduct their study. All 
of the equipment and software used to recover data was housed in a secured and network isolated room. All 
devices studied during the research were also stored in this location. The room was secured with a fresh 
lock limiting access to only the researchers and investigators. The equipment, used to analyze the mobile 
devices, was connected to a local area network within the laboratory. An Internet connected machine 
located outside of the laboratory was used to assist the research where necessary for tasks like using 
publicly available databases to acquire additional information on mobile device models. Finally, no 
personal digital devices of any type were allowed in the laboratory at any time. 
Recovered data was temporarily stored on a single machine until its contents had been analyzed. Once 
checked, data was transferred to a single machine via a local network within the laboratory and backed up 
to a separate external hard disk. This procedure minimized the risk of illegal data being found on the 
storage machine or backup and, therefore, avoid having to supply the entire data set to the police. Details of 
precautions taken in a laboratory setup were not described in the other studies. 
In the Glisson and Storer (2013) study, research focuses on residual data from thirty-two mobile devices 
that were issued to and returned by employees in a global Fortune 500 company. A similar detailed data 
extraction process was followed that was derived from their previous case study (Glisson et al., 2011).  
2.3 Profile of the Data Recovered 
The exact purpose and method of analysis varied between the different studies. Glisson et al. (2011) 
categorized each data artefact recovered according to whether it was considered ‘personal’ if the item could 
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be associated with personal, non-corporate use of the device, ‘sensitive’ if the item was considered to be 
potentially compromising for the device's former owner; and/or ‘deleted’ if the analysis indicated that the 
user had attempted to remove the item from the device. Garfinkel and Shelat (2003) were concerned with 
investigating the efficacy of device sanitization practices but also provided commentary on examples of 
files recovered from the hard disks investigated. All of the Jones studies (Jones, Dardick, et al., 2009; Jones, 
Valli, et al., 2009; Jones et al., 2008) and the Szewczyk and Sansurooah (2011) study categorized devices in 
terms of the presence of identifying information, as well as providing informal commentary on files 
recovered. 
All of the studies used the data recovered to investigate the extent of risks to privacy of the device's former 
owners. In addition, the data gathered by Garfinkel and Shelat (2003) and Glisson and Storer (2013) have 
been used as the basis for evaluating and/or comparing the performance of digital forensic tools on real-
world data sets. 
All of the studies reported significant amounts of personal, sensitive, personally identifying and/or 
corporate data recovered from the devices examined. Table 1, Studies In-The-Wild, summarizes the results 
presented in the different papers, which are discussed in more detail below. 
Identifying Information 
Jones et al. (2009) reported the number of devices examined which contained personally identifying 
information broken down by region. In total, the study reported that 62 of the 338 hard disks examined 
contained information allowing the organization that had previously owned the hard disk to be identified. 
Also, 55 contained information allowing individuals to be identified. Glisson et al. (2011) did not attempt to 
determine whether information on devices examined was personally identifying. However, they did recover 
some 1740 contact database entries from the devices they examined. 
Personally Sensitive 
All of the studies recovered information that could be judged personally sensitive information to the 
device's former owner.  For example: 
• Glisson et al. (2011) and  Glisson and Storer (2013) reported the recovery of personal photographs 
containing (adult) nudity,  probably taken with the device's camera. 
• Garfinkel and Shelat (2003), Jones et al. (2009), and Glisson et al. (2011) all report the discovery of 
health related information, including medical records, personal conversations about health issues 
(via SMS) and insurance documentation. 
• Glisson et al. (2011) recovered several probable personal identifying numbers (PINs) used in 
banking disguised as contact information and Garfinkel and Shelat (2003) recovered thousands of 
credit card numbers. 
• Garfinkel and Shelat (2003), Jones et al. (2009), and Glisson et al. (2011) all reported discovering 
pornographic content on the devices examined. In particular, Jones et al. (2009) reported discovery 
of pornography on hard disks that were identifiable with commercial organizations. 
All of the studies reported finding personal photographs (including family photographs) on devices in their 
corpus. 
Commercial and Corporate 
The studies of hard disks, USB devices and memory cards reported significant amounts of information from 
commercial and other corporate contexts. Szewczyk and Sansurooah (2011) reported discovery of business 
plans, resumes, contact information and pay slips. Jones et al. (2009) found intellectual property material 
relating to a motor vehicle company, as well as a substantial amount of material from a legal firm.  In 
addition, Jones et al. (2009) also found correspondence concerning currency transactions worth $50 billion. 
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Government, Political and Public 
The studies by Jones et al., (Jones, Dardick, et al., 2009; Jones, Valli, et al., 2009) and Szewczyk and 
Sansurooah (2011) all found information relating to government activities, including documentation from 
an embassy with minutes of internal meetings; details of a government department's budgets and future 
plans; and photographs and information on Ministry of Defence (UK) police officers. 
Jones et al. (2009) found extensive material from educational organizations, such as schools and 
universities. These included research material gathered by a university employee and lists of students 
attending a primary (elementary) school in the United Kingdom. 
Illegal Content 
Jones et al. (2009) reported that 19 of the hard disks examined contained ‘illicit’ material. Illegally obtained 
software license keys are reported as an example of this category. In contrast, Glisson et al. (2011) 
explicitly stated that no illegal content was recovered during their study, despite, for example, discovering 
SMS conversations discussing illegal drug use.  
For all of the studies examined, it is not clear what guidelines or standards were followed in determining 
that this content was illegal, illicit or otherwise, in the reported studies. It may be, for example, that material 
was judged to be illicit if it was not actually criminally sanctionable, but could be the subject of a 
disciplinary investigation in a corporate environment. 
‘User Deleted’ Content 
Several of the studies reported the extent of ‘user deleted’ content that was retrieved from studied devices. 
This is content that the user intended to remove from the device but did not do so successfully. Usually, the 
presence of the content is no longer presented on the user interface but is still resident on the storage device. 
This may be due to content de-registration in a file system, or content that has been marked for deletion, but 
the actual step of removing the bytes of data has not taken place. 
Glisson et al. (2011) found some user data on all of the mobile devices examined, however, none of the 
devices had been completely or successfully wiped. Hence, user deleted artifacts were on 15 (31%) of the 
devices examined. In contrast, in the Jones et al. (2008) study 27 (17%) of the devices examined yielded no 
user data. No report is made on evidence of user-deleted data in the study. This difference between the two 
studies may be accounted for by the differences in the devices examined. A substantial proportion of the 
devices examined by Jones et al. (2008) appear to be older first and second generation devices, whereas 
Glisson et al. (2011) focused on newer devices. In addition, from the methodological details available, it 
appears that Glisson et al. (2011) went to greater lengths to recover data from the devices they examined 
than Jones et al. (2008). 
Glisson et al. (2011) reported that they recovered some 1,934 artifacts as being user deleted, representing 
almost 17% of their total corpus. Glisson et al. (2011) attempted to investigate the correlation between 
artefact category (personal, sensitive) and whether the user had attempted to delete them. However, the 
sample size was too small to make an assessment. 
In contrast to the Glisson et al. (2011) study, Garfinkel and Shelat (2003) found that only 12 (9%) of the 
hard disks they examined had been thoroughly sanitized so that no residual data remained. Of the un-
sanitized disks, they report that ‘practically' all contained user deleted data.  Similarly, Jones et al. (2009) 
reported that 61 (18%) of the hard disks examined in their study had been thoroughly sanitized. However, 
in contrast to the Garfinkel and Shelat (2003) study, only 83 (25%) of the disks examined were reported to 
show evidence of user deletion. This discrepancy may be due to Jones et al. (2009) using a more restrictive 
definition of ‘user deletion’ in situations where it is clear that the former owner intended to fully wipe the 
hard disk, but failed to do so. 
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Of the two flash storage studies, Jones et al. (2009) reported that only two (5%) of the USB devices studied 
had been thoroughly wiped but, in contrast, the Szewczyk and Sansurooah (2011) study found that 14 
(12%) of the memory cards examined, a far higher percentage, had been wiped. Additionally, 20 (47%) of 
the USB devices contained user deleted, but recoverable, data as compared with 89 (75%) of memory cards. 
Summary 
Despite the differences in these studies, there is a coherent picture from all of them. A substantial amount of 
personal and/or sensitive information was found as residual data on a variety of storage device types 
available from secondary markets. Further, a large corpus of residual data can be recovered from relatively 
small device samples. The recovery of this residual data presents ethical and legal challenges when 
conducting studies in-the-wild. 
3. CHALLENGES IN INVESTIGATING RESIDUAL DATA 
This section discusses the legal and ethical challenges that may be encountered when conducting residual 
data research. Where available, commentary on the issues identified in the other studies is also referenced. 
Where legal concerns are addressed, the discussion focuses on United Kingdom, European Union and 
United States contexts, where a large portion, but not all of the work described, was conducted. 
3.1 Participant Consent 
A key principle of studies involving human participants is the need to establish and document the 
participant's informed consent. In the United Kingdom, exemptions in the Data Protection Act (UK 
Parliament, 1998) permit legitimate researchers, in some circumstances, to record personal data without 
informed consent. However, although collection of residual data may be lawful, it may not, necessarily, be 
ethical. Some of the authors of this paper, for example, are required by their employer to follow the British 
Psychological Society’s (2010) Code of Conduct for research involving human participants. 
Typically, participants in a study are given a consent form that describes the purpose of the study, what data 
will be collected and how it and any derived results will be disseminated. Further, the consent form will 
normally describe how personal data will be secured and destroyed once the research is complete. In 
addition, the British Psychological Society’s (2010) Code of Conduct requires participant's to be informed, 
before an experiment begins, that they can withdraw from a research study at any time and any data 
collected, up to that point, will be destroyed. 
Depending on how a device that potentially contains residual data is acquired, these procedures may not be 
possible for several reasons: 
• It may not be possible to identify and/or trace the device's owner before data is recovered and 
analyzed, particularly if a device has had many owners prior to be being acquired for the purpose of 
the research. If each previous owner is treated as a study participant, each would need to be 
informed about the study and prior consent, for the use of their data obtained, before the research 
could proceed. This may be impossible without accessing data on the device in order to identify 
previous owners. 
• It may be difficult to determine who the ‘participants’ are, in a study of residual data, for the 
purpose of acquiring informed consent. For example, a device may have had users who were not 
the device's owners. In any case, it is not clear that the previous owners or users of a device, or the 
on-going owners of data on the device, are ‘participants’ in the accepted sense of the term, since 
they are not actively participating in a study. However, data about them is being used in the study. 
• Rejecting devices for which researchers are unable to obtain informed consent from the original 
owners and users who generated residual digital data may present an unacceptable study bias. This 
may be a particular problem where research investigates the extent of personal or sensitive artifacts 
in a residual data corpus. Former users or owners may be more likely to withhold consent where 
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they believe sensitive or personal data may be found on a device, regardless of assurances about 
privacy and security from investigators. 
Consequently, requiring researchers to obtain informed consent can present insurmountable challenges to 
studies employing residual data. 
3.2 Device and Data Ownership 
As suggested in the challenges section, there is a distinction between a data owner and a data storage device 
owner, or data holder. This distinction is codified in the United Kingdom in the Data Protection Act (UK 
Parliament, 1998).  
When an item is purchased, various pieces of legislation impact product and/or service interaction. 
Legislation relating to contract law is the primary piece of legislation governing this area. However, 
consumers are accustomed to treating ICT equipment, which is purchased every day, as physical artifacts. 
Hence, end-users are lured into treating the contracts governing the disposal of ICT equipment and data 
storage devices in the same manner. This creates an environment where an organization sells all of its old 
equipment at the end of its life to a reseller and the reseller collects physical artifacts and considers that to 
be the end of the matter.  
This view is, however, incorrect because under the UK Data Protection Act an ICT data storage device is 
viewed as not only a physical device but, also, a logical device. The logical device has a unique set of legal 
requirements that cannot be transferred. The Logical device will contain not only personal and corporate 
data, but also software and operating system licenses. 
There are many different types of software licenses that can fall into the realm of software license 
management. These license types range from single user license, to original equipment manufacturer 
license bundles, to education software agreements. Some licenses state that the license is specific to the 
machine on which the software is executing and that the license to use the software becomes null and void 
when the machine is recycled and destroyed. Others provide the ability for a user to un-register a machine 
and to re-register the software to another machine. While research investigates the cost of software re-use, 
the actual figures on how many organizations fail to take advantage of this functionality and, thus, incur the 
cost of the lost license is not known. From a software piracy perspective, the ability to harvest and resell 
software licenses from second hand computer hard-drives offers the ability to potentially generate 
significant income.  
Under the data protection act, the organization that generates the personal data is responsible for processing 
the data. The data protection act defines a data controller as “...a person who (either alone or jointly or in 
common with other persons) determines the purposes for which and the manner in which any personal data 
are, or are to be, processed" (UK Parliament, 1998).  
According to the definition in the data protection act, a data controller or data controllers must decide the 
purposes for which and the way in which personal data are, or will be, processed. The determination of the 
purposes for which personal data are to be processed is paramount in deciding whether or not an individual 
or organization is a data controller. When a person determines the purposes for which personal data is to be 
processed, a decision as to the manner in which those data are to be processed is often inherent in that 
decision. In particular:  
• Personal data shall be obtained only for one or more specified and lawful purposes, and shall not be 
further processed in any manner incompatible with that purpose or those purposes.  
• Appropriate technical and organizational measures shall be taken against unauthorized or unlawful 
processing of personal data and against accidental loss or destruction of, or damage to, personal 
data. 
• Where processing of personal data is carried out by a data processor on behalf of a data controller, 
the data controller must, in order to comply with the seventh principle: choose a data processor 
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providing sufficient guarantees in respect of the technical and organizational security measures 
governing the processing to be carried out, and take reasonable steps to ensure compliance with 
those measures. 
Therefore, the act places certain responsibilities on data holders regarding the custody of data on behalf of 
data owners. European legislation provides for similar regulations. The implication for studies of residual 
data in the United Kingdom is that former owners of data storage devices continue to retain rights over the 
data on the device even after they have sold them. Once the researchers have obtained the device and 
accessed the data, they are acting as data holders with a responsibility to ensure the integrity and security of 
the data on behalf of the data owners. These responsibilities exist even though the former owners of the 
device will be unaware of the use of the data. 
A consequence of these responsibilities is apparent in the way that results are disseminated from residual 
data studies in the United Kingdom.  All of the studies reviewed that were based in the United Kingdom 
provided only abstracted information on the types of data artifacts found on the devices studied. In addition, 
none of these studies (as far as is known) have published the raw data on which their reports are based. In 
contrast, the data gathered by the (S. L. Garfinkel & Shelat, 2003) study which was based in the United 
States has been compiled into a corpus of storage device images that are made available to legitimate 
researchers (S. Garfinkel, Farrell, Roussev, & Dinolt, 2009). 
A final aspect of data ownership concerns disposal. None of the studies describe how devices were disposed 
of following the experiment. Indeed, in the (S. L. Garfinkel & Shelat, 2003) study, the data recovered is 
now available as a corpus for evaluating forensic software tools and will, hopefully, be maintained by the 
researchers indefinitely. 
In the United Kingdom, researchers are under a legal and ethical obligation to ensure that data collected in a 
research study is destroyed once the work is complete (British Psychological Society, 2010; UK Parliament, 
1998). Researchers must ensure that storage devices that are used for data analysis and the original devices 
containing the residual data are effectively erased. This can be particularly challenging to achieve when 
researchers are working with certain categories of storage devices such as embedded flash chips. This is due 
to less than effective deletion facilities on individual devices. 
3.3 Data Protection Laws 
Many countries have laws designed to protect data privacy and security. For instance, accessing data on a 
digital storage device without the permission of the content's owner(s) could be considered a violation of 
the Computer Misuse Act (UK Parliament, 1990) since it is unlikely that the former owner of a device 
conceived or consciously gave permission for residual data to be accessed by researchers. 
A specific case concerns access to content that is protected by encryption or access control mechanisms. In 
this situation, attempts by researchers to circumvent controls could be considered criminal activity. This 
situation is complicated because many of the software tools (such as digital forensic toolkits) contain 
features to help investigators bypass controls. In some circumstances these features are applied 
automatically to a device, or the toolkit is configured to use them by default. 
One thing to consider is whether it is necessary for the purposes of the experiment to attempt to circumvent 
these controls. If the research is only concerned with measuring readily accessible data, for example, then 
storage devices that have been encrypted may not require further examination. 
Even in countries with arguably less stringent data protection laws (such as the US), the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 prohibits the transfer of personal health information 
(PHI) from a covered entity (e.g. healthcare provider, insurance company, or clearing house) to an entity 
not involved in patient treatment or payment for treatment without the express consent of the individual to 
which the data pertains. HIPAA does allow a covered entity to share PHI with their business associates 
provided they agree to provide the same protections as the covered entity (CMS, 2013). 
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3.4 Encountering Illegal Information 
There is a possibility that a storage device acquired from secondary sources may contain data that is 
considered illegal in a given jurisdiction. Examples include digital evidence of conventional criminality 
such as fraud, drug dealing or even terrorism; and criminal activity more usually associated with ICT, 
notably illicit pornographic images or videos. 
The difficulty for researchers investigating residual data is in ascertaining the contents of a storage device 
acquired from the secondary markets without viewing illegal material, which could be a criminal act in 
some jurisdictions. From the research study's perspective, there is the risk that any illegal content will also 
‘contaminate’ legal material recovered from other storage devices, since police investigators may need to 
confiscate all storage devices identified as containing illegal material. 
Glisson et al. (2011) described a procedure for minimizing this risk in their study. The procedure involved 
storing data recovered from a device on a single PC while it was examined by an investigator. Once it had 
been determined that the data did not contain any illegal content, it was added to the corpus. This meant that 
should illegal content be discovered, only the hard disk from the PC used for analysis would need to be 
supplied to the police. 
Glisson et al. (2011) also established procedures for research investigators to report illegal content to legal 
authorities if and when it was discovered. The research investigators were trained to immediately report the 
discovery of potentially illegal content, whenever they were in doubt, to one of the lead researchers. If the 
researcher determined the content was illegal, the hard disk on which the content was stored was to be 
removed and transferred to a safe until it could be provided to the police. This procedure minimized the risk 
of researchers or investigators being prosecuted for holding illegal content. 
3.5 Risk to Stakeholders 
From these studies we have identified five unique categories of individuals who may experience risk arising 
from a study of residual data on ICT devices.  These include: 
• Previous owners 
• Previous device users 
• Others who have interacted with previous owners or users 
• Researchers and Research assistants 
• Current device owners (if not owned by the researchers) 
We will discuss the risks to each group. 
Risk to Previous Owners 
A blatant threat to the previous device owner(s) is the risk of privacy violations. For many individuals, ICT 
devices function as a modern day multimedia diary complete with photos, text and email conversations, and 
even GPS logs. A secondary, but related, risk involves user security. Risks in this category can involve 
issues of personal and financial security. Personal security could be compromised if device data can be used 
to predict where an individual might be at any given time (Grispos, Glisson, Pardue, & Dickson, 2015). 
Financial security could be compromised if account passwords or near field communication payment 
information is recovered from the device. Lastly, legal liability can arise if the previous owner(s) engaged 
in illegal behavior with the device, such as hacking or viewing child pornography. Information recovered 
from the device could be used as evidence in legal proceedings. Legal liability can also arise when devices 
are used for legal activities (such as a physician accessing patient records) and practitioners fail to take 
steps to ensure that residual data does not remain on the device (HIPAA violation). 
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Risk to Previous Device Users 
In some cases, the previous users of the device were never the owners of the device. This can occur in 
situations when an organization issues devices to its employees for work-related purposes. The risk to these 
users is similar to those of previous device owners, however, privacy expectations are, generally, lower 
when using corporately-owned devices. 
Risk to Others Who Have Interacted With the Device 
While most studies focus on the risk to those who have actually come into contact with the device, it should 
not be forgotten that the main function of ICT’s is communication. Therefore, those who have 
communicated with the device being studied are also at risk. Residual text messages, emails, and pictures 
are good examples of sensitive data that can be left behind on a device and present a risk to an individuals’ 
privacy. 
Risks to researchers and research assistants 
Researchers and research assistants encounter different kinds of risk when conducting research in this area. 
An obvious risk is the discovery of data that initiates involvement in a legal investigation and an 
accompanying loss of data.  Some of the studies examined earlier in this paper detailed the extensive 
measures taken to ensure that any illegal data found would be turned over to the authorities and that the 
illegal data would be isolated from the rest of the data collected so that researchers would not lose access to 
all of their data if computers, hard drives, and devices were turned over to the authorities. A second, but less 
obvious, risk is the psychological risk associated with exposure to data of a highly personal nature. Previous 
studies indicate that there is an elevated risk of depression among those who deal with the sensitive 
personal data of others such as social workers and those in healthcare (Health.com, 2010). Hence, it is 
plausible that having access to large amounts of sensitive personal data could trigger depression in 
researchers as well. 
Risks to device owners (if not owned by the researchers) 
Lastly, organizations or individuals who make devices available to researchers also face some risk 
depending on the country in which the research is being conducted. As noted earlier, data protection laws in 
Europe and other places can be more stringent than those in the United States. While in the US, ownership 
of data transfers with the device on which the data resides, this is not true in some countries (e.g. UK). 
These laws could open device owners up to legal liability for allowing researchers to access owned devices. 
Even in countries with less restrictive data protection laws, legal liability can arise from organizational data 
(such as patient treatment data) being accessed by researchers outside of the organization unless agreements 
are signed beforehand that protect the organization and its data. 
The various risks acknowledged in this section prompted deliberations focusing on protecting stakeholders 
and mitigating risk. In an attempt to achieve this goal, the following residual data research practices have 
been compiled. 
4. RECOMMENDED RESIDUAL DATA RESEARCH PRACTICES 
This segment presents recommended practices for conducting research using in-the-wild residual data. 
These practices are based on the experiences reported in the sections investigating the Review of Residual 
Data Studies and identifying the Challenges in Investigating Residual Data. 
4.1 Identifying Research Objectives 
Before beginning a research study using residual data it is important to be clear about the objectives and 
rationale for the work. In particular, because of the sensitivity of material that may be gathered, it is 
important to ensure that the use of residual data is essential for the objectives of the study. A study to 
determine the extent of privacy risks on a particular category of storage devices can be justified in using 
residual data. Research work to develop a realistic corpus of material for evaluating forensic software can 
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also be justified, since there are currently no other methods for constructing such a corpus. In contrast, 
studies that intend to use devices obtained from the secondary market purely because they are cheaper are 
unlikely to receive ethical approval. In these circumstances, the justification is not based on the objectives 
of the research, but on cost grounds, which is normally inadequate. 
Similarly, when devising data recovery methods for acquired devices, it is important to consider what tools 
are appropriate to meet the research objectives and minimize privacy threats to former device owners. For 
example, a study that is concerned with monitoring trends in sanitization procedures may not need to use 
tools, which visualize the contents of a storage device. Tools or scripts, which only determine whether a 
device has been thoroughly sanitized, may be sufficient. 
4.2 Investigator Training 
Providing investigators with the foundation for conducting research on devices that contain real data is 
critical. Investigators need to be trained on how to use data extraction tools whether they are commercially 
available or open source. 
Training not only impacts the amount of overall data that is potentially recoverable but it also helps to deter 
contamination possibilities. Investigators need to be made aware that they may be exposed to unpleasant 
information and even potentially illegal information. Procedures need to be explicitly identified and 
presented to the investigators on how to handle these situations. This training should also include educating 
investigators on the importance of data privacy and the signing of non-disclosure agreements. 
There is the possibility that investigators of digital devices could run across passwords to email, cloud 
storage services or social networking web sites. Investigators need to be instructed to never, under any 
circumstances, access data on outside systems through the device they are examining or other computers 
involved in the extraction or analysis of residual data. In addition, access to extracted data should be highly 
regulated. 
4.3 Device Acquisition Management 
Storage devices containing residual data can be obtained from a variety of sources and under different 
circumstances, for example: 
• donated by volunteers; 
• purchased from secondary markets, such as pawnbrokers and auction sites; 
• loaned from resellers or original equipment manufacturers, prior to destruction; 
• loaned from a third party that maintains its own device corpus; 
• obtained from lost property departments; 
• acquired from a corporate IT department's device life-cycle management processes. 
The source of residual data may have implications for data ownership, and consequently for the methods 
employed in recovering, analyzing and disposing of data, depending on the jurisdiction in which research is 
conducted. 
Issues of device and data ownership, when sourcing from secondary markets, were discussed in the 
challenges section. Different constraints may arise, for example, if the devices are on loan, since there may 
be an obligation to return the devices to the provider unaltered. In these situations, it may be necessary for 
researchers to establish what actions will be taken with a device set after it is returned to the provider and 
factor these constraints into the study's objectives and methodology. Researchers may be required to 
transfer possession of storage devices to criminal investigators if illegal content is discovered. 
Devices acquired from a corporate IT department may be subject to very different legal and ethical 
constraints. It is not unusual for corporate organizations to require users of IT equipment to transfer 
ownership of data created and/or held on the devices to the organization. Consequently, researchers may be 
under relaxed legal constraints when working with residual data sourced from corporate environments, 
14 
since they may never act as data holders. However, work in this context may still give rise to ethical 
dilemmas. For example, results of a study of residual data might reveal examples of misbehavior by 
employees of an organization. It is not clear whether the results of studies of residual data should be 
available to managers in an organization in order to take disciplinary action. Regardless of the ethical 
position, researchers should at least be clear about the objectives of a research study with an organization 
and the limits to which results can be used, before data recovery and analysis commences. 
4.4 Data Anonymization 
The anonymization of extracted residual data is beneficial to all parties involved, directly or indirectly, with 
the research. It protects potentially sensitive information of participants like credit card numbers, national 
insurance numbers, Global Position System (GPS) data on images stored on devices, medical appointments, 
and sensitive company documents. Hence, all data should be anonymized through the presentation of the 
information in broad categories and generalities. 
4.5 Lifecycle Security Practices 
A description of security measures for protecting participant data is a standard part of approval and consent 
procedures for studies involving human participants (UK Parliament, 1998). Details typically include a 
description of how data will be stored and who will have access to the data. However, security practices 
with residual data need to be considerably more robust than for data recorded for conventional experiments 
with human participants. As noted above in the Challenges section, it is unlikely that data owners will have 
provided explicit consent for data to be gathered. Consequently, any data recovered may contain 
information that a ‘participant’ might not ordinarily volunteer.  In addition, it is important to develop 
practices that ensure data integrity should it be necessary, at a later point in time, to transfer this information 
to the police for a criminal investigation. 
Glisson et al. (2011) described their procedures for securing the residual data they recovered from mobile 
devices using a combination of physical and electronic measures. All equipment and acquired devices were 
stored in a physically secured and network isolated laboratory. Personal electronic devices not associated 
with the research were not permitted in the room. The hard disks of the machines used to recover data were 
erased after the experiment was complete. The corpus was stored on an encrypted and physically secured 
hard disk for future analysis. Finally, the corpus of devices was stored in a physically secure location after 
data had been recovered. 
As noted above, none of the studies addressed the disposal of residual data and devices after the completion 
of an experiment. This is, however, a crucial aspect of ensuring the on-going privacy of the device's former 
owners. Re-selling devices on secondary markets may be a tempting proposition to reduce costs associated 
with a study. However, storage devices need to be thoroughly erased before decommissioning and disposal. 
Where it cannot be guaranteed and demonstrated that this has occurred (when investigating embedded 
storage devices, for example), it may be necessary to contract a reputable organization to ensure that the 
entire device is destroyed. 
A further option to consider is obtaining independent audits of the security procedures employed while 
residual data is being held for research. This can be undertaken on a reciprocal basis by other researchers 
with experience in conducting research with residual data. 
4.6 Ethics Committee Liaison 
Research utilizing in-the-wild residual data is still relatively scarce, so it is unlikely that the members of an 
institution's ethics committee will have previous experience in handling both legal and ethical issues. Hagen 
et al. (2005) has argued that ethics committees are (understandably) ill-equipped to manage the legal and 
ethical issues involved in ‘in-the-wild’ research in general. 
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Consequently, effective liaison between the research team and the relevant institution's ethics committee is 
essential throughout the conduct of the study. As well as explaining the usual objectives and rationale for 
the research, applications for ethical approval for residual data research should be accompanied by:  
• a justification for the use of residual data in the research;  
• an explanation of why the research cannot be effectively conducted using non-residual data 
sources;  
• a description of the ethical concerns and risks raised by the use of residual data; and 
• a description of the steps taken to address or mitigate these concerns. 
Contact should be maintained between researchers and the ethics committee during the gathering and 
analysis of residual data. In particular, it is important for the ethics committee to be informed should any of 
the risks described during the approval process be manifested. Demonstrating competence in managing 
these issues can help alleviate concerns as to the risks for future research. However, researchers should 
accept that in some circumstances it may be necessary for an ethics committee to halt a research study when 
such risks are manifest. 
Finally, it is helpful to provide a summary report to the ethics committee after the research is complete. 
Supplying ethics committee members with papers describing the results of the research can help ease 
approval processes in this difficult area for future research studies. 
4.7 International Residual Data Gathering 
Of the studies examined, only the Jones et al. (2009) research appears to have attempted to compare 
residual data risks between multiple countries or legal jurisdictions. In their case, data recovery and analysis 
took place in each country (Australia, France, Germany, United Kingdom and United States) independently, 
with only the summary information from each country collated in the study findings. 
Policy makers in the European Union and the United Kingdom have already begun to suggest that data 
transfer beyond their borders may be problematic, due to differences in regulatory approaches to data 
protection (Information Commissioner's Office, 2012; Working Party, 2012). Wolthusen (2009) has argued 
that these regulatory issues will make criminal investigation of digital crimes across borders more 
problematic in the future. It is likely that these complexities will be no less problematic for privacy 
researchers. 
Regulation of data ownership and rights appear far more permissive in the United States than in the 
European Union. It is unclear whether, for example, the Data Protection Act (UK Parliament, 1998) would 
apply to residual data collected in the United States and transferred to the United Kingdom. Certainly, it 
would seem that regulations prevent a similar transfer of (non-residual) data to the United States (Grispos, 
Storer, & Glisson, 2012). Any researcher intending to transfer raw residual data across international 
boundaries should certainly seek legal advice before doing so. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This research reviewed the available studies that have used residual data In-The-Wild. The studies to date 
have focused on residual data recovered from several different digital storage technologies (hard disks and 
flash media chips) integrated in a range of ICTs, including desktop and laptop personal computers, servers, 
external USB storage, mobile devices and handheld devices. These early studies have already demonstrated 
the extent of personal, sensitive and identifying information available from residual data sources. This work 
has meant that the first steps in estimating the risks of residual data to individual and corporate privacy have 
begun to be investigated and quantified. The work has also provided impetus for ICT vendors to improve 
life-cycle protections for user privacy in the products they offer. 
Investigating residual data for research purposes carries its own privacy risks, as identified in this paper. 
The synthesis of the study methodologies presented in this paper provides a compendium of good practices 
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to guide other researchers working with residual data. Future studies of residual data may seek to integrate 
and adapt these practices in a variety of ways. Researchers in the future, for example, may seek to use 
sources of residual data to validate findings from other research methodologies. 
Alternatively, researchers may begin to address the residual data risks in other ICTs that have not been 
examined to date. The data sources considered so far concern relatively small-scale storage capacities. 
However, data storage is increasingly becoming remote and virtualized. Social media applications, for 
example, enable users to record huge quantities of data about their private lives, which may be difficult to 
alter or erase if an account becomes abandoned. These environments present both new opportunities and 
risks for researchers working with residual data. Existing principles and practices will need to be 
substantially altered, if residual data methodologies are to be used in recovering, analyzing and 
understanding residual data in these environments. 
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